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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
TORTS: NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITOR-EXCLUSIVE

CONTROL

Pennsylvania's doctrine of "exclusive control" was applied by the Federal
Court in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in the case of Trouser Cbrporation of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153 F (2d) 284 (1946), follow-

ing the rule laid down in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64. The case was
in the Federal Court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Water escaped
from the defendant's premises and leaked through the floor to the damage of
the plaintiff whose place of business occupied the floor below. The water came
from the defendant's "Fulflo Filter," a part of the water purifying machinery
needed in its business. The jury in the lower court found for the plaintiff. On
appeal, the Circuit Court said that the jury was at liberty to infer negligence on the
part of the defendant from this combination of facts, because of the defendant's
exclusive control over the part of the premises where the filter was kept, and thus
over the knowledge of how the filter was operated, and also because the accident
was such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen in the absence of
negligence.
The court in allowing the jury to draw this inference of negligence based
its decision upon similar Pennsylvania cases in which the seepage of water was
either affirmatively proved to be negligent, Killion v. Power, 51 Pa. 429, or
negligence was allowed to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Levinson v. Myers, 24 Pa. Super. 481, Silver Costume Co. v. Passant, 71 Pa. Super.

252, Majestic Amusement Co. v. Standard Cigar Co., 79 Pa. Super. 309.
The decision that Pennsylvania's doctrine of "exclusive control" applied rather
than Pennsylvania's doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur was based upon the diagnosis
and separation of these two doctrines by the same court in Sierocinski i'. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours Co., 118 F. (2d) 531, in which it was said that the doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur was limited in its application to cases involving injury (o
passengers through the transportation operations of common carriers or to patrons
of utilities dispensing a service which if not properly managed and controlled
may readily prove dangerous; whereas the doctrine of "exclusive control" applies
where the accident by which the injury occurred is of a nature which ordinarily
does not happen in the absence of negligence, and the circumstances surrounding
the accident were under the exclusive control of the defendant. Since this definition of Pennsylvania's doctrine of "exclusive control" is identical with the usual
text book definition of Res Ipsa Loquitur as accepted in most jurisdictions, Prosser
on Torts, (1941) page 293, it is at first difficult to see the reason for drawing
such a distinction in Pennsylvania. The distinction becomes even more obscure
upon realization that Pennsylvania's two doctrines are identical in underlying principle. Wallace v. Keystone Auotmobile Co., 239 Pa. 110 (Res Ipsa Loquitur);
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Maltz v. Carter, 311 Pa. 550 ("exclusive control"). That principle is that
where the instrumentality which causes the injury as well as the facts surrounding
it are under the exclusive dominion of the defendant, the burden on the plaintiff
to establish defendant's negligence should be eased. But Pennsylvania courts
have definitely committed themselves to applying their doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur only to common carriers, public utilities, and some others. East End Oil Co.
-v. The Penna. Torpedo Co., 190 Pa. 350; Delahunt v. United Telephone & Telelegraph Co., 215 Pa. 241; Shaughnessy v. Director General of Railroads, 274 Pa.
413; Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376. Confinement within these narrow limits is
based upon the high duty of care owed in these situations by the defendant to the
plaintiff. Delahunt v. United Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra; Laing v.
Colder, 8 Pa. 479; Burns v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 294 Pa. 277. Very often
it is a contractual liability but whether this is absolutely necessary has not been
made clear. Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co., 184 Pa. 519; Fay v. 900 North 63rd
Street Corp., 137 Pa. Super. 496; Wallace v. Keystone Automobile Co., supra.
There is no doubt, however, that there is a complete severance between the two
lines of cases in spite of the similarity of underlying principle.
Obviously, the severance must exist because of a difference in the procedural
Lffect given to the two doctrines. It is usually stated that there are -three alternatives to the procedural effect given to the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur: (1)
That a mere permissi ble inference of negligence is raised which allows the plaintiff to escape a non-suit and allows the case to go to the jury; (2) That a presumption may arise which entitles the plaintiff to a directed verdict unless the defendant
introduces evidence to meet it; (3) That the ultimate burden of proof shifts
to the defendant who is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he wa5 not negligent. Prosser on Torts (1941), page 303. Up until the
decisions in the principal case and the Sierocinski case, supra, the similarity of
these two doctrines and the indiscriminate use of the same terminology when
applied to either situation, had caused much confusion and uncertainty, not only
uncertainty as to when either doctrine will be applied, but also as to what the
procedural effect will be. Shafer v. Lacock, Hawthorn & Co., 168 Pa. 497
("exclusive control" case with presumption of negligence allowed); Wallace v.
Keystone Automobile Company, supra (Res Ipsa Loquitur case allowing "at least"
a permissible inference); McCoy v. Ohio Valley Gas Company, 213 Pa. 367
("exclusive control" case with inference of negligence alloved); Sullivan v. The
Pbiladelphiaand Reading Railroad, 30 Pa. 234, (Res Ipsa Loquitur case allowing a presumption).
The principal case and the Sierocinski case, supra, have pointed out that the
procedural effect to be given to the doctrine now named "exclusive control" is
that a permissible inference of negligence will be allowed. The distinction
between the two doctrines then becomes intelligible in the light of past decisions
in the great majority of cases holding that the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
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carries the procedural effect of a presumption. Shaughnessy v. Director General
of Railroads, supra; Norris v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co., 334 Pa. 161; Delaney v.
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 266 Pa. 122; DuPont v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 337 Pa. 89. However, this presumption unlike other jurisdictions
results in a transposed burden of proof, requiring the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not negligent. Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa.
182.

Since this is such a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff, it is easily
seen why the courts have narrowly limited its application. However, this strong
presumption was being applied to cases in Pennsylvania where high duty existed
Laing v. Colder, supra
long before the Latin label was uttered in England.
(1848); Sullivan v. The Philadelphiaand Reading Railroad Co., supra (1858);
Res Ipsa Loquitur originated in the English case of Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C.

722 (1863). When the courts in Pennsylvania adopted the Latin label and
applied it to these cases having this strong presumption, they eliminated the
possibility of applying the same name to the other line of cases with a different
procedural effect. Thus we now have the doctrine of "exclusive control." Unfortunately, this doctrine with the very same procedural effect of a permissible
inference has been labelled Res Ipsa Loquitur in the majorityof other jurisdictions. It is submitted that a recognition of this fact will be an aid toward-clarification of this controversial point.
NORMAN OLEWILER

TORTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLISION -

NEGLIGENCE

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The mere happening of a collision between two motor vehicles fixes no
liability for its causation. Grimes v. Yellow Cab Co., 344 Pa. 298 (1942). In
a recent case, Neff v. Firth, 354 Pa. 308 (1946), 47 A. 2d 193, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reiterated this rule and stated, "Negligence is the gist of an action for such an accident and the burden of proving facts legally sufficient to
support a findink of negligence is upon the one asserting consequent liability."
As the court said in Martin v. Marateck, 345 Pa. 103 (1942), "In addition to
establishing the fact of accident, it was incumbent upon [the plaintiff] so to
describe, picture, or visualize what actually happened at the time of the accident
as to enable one fixed with the responsibility for ascertaining the facts to find
that [the defendant] was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident."
It is not necessary, however, that the alleged negligence be proven by direct
testimony. "The proof may be furnished by circumstances themselves, The test

132
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is whether they are such as to satisfy reasonable and well-balanced minds that
the accident resulted from the negligence of the defendant." Rowles v. Evanuik,
350 Pa. 64 (1944).

In the Neff case the plaintiff was driving northeastwardly in the outer lane
of a four lane highway, which lane is separated from the inner lane by an eight
foot grass plot. The grass plot is broken at points by paved cut-offs which permit
the passage of vehicles from the inner to the outer lane and vice versa. While
the plaintiff was crossing one of the cut-offs at a moderate speed his car was
struck in the rear by the one driven by the defendant.
The defendant stated to a motorcycle guard who reached the scene shortly
after the accident happened that she was traveling in the same direction as the
plaintiff but in the inner lane. At the time of the accident she was in the act
of crossing over at the cut-off to the outer lane to enable her to make a right
hand turn off the highway at an intersection beyond. She stated that she had
looked "up and down" and "didn't see anything" and that the first thing she
knew, her front fender struck the plaintiff's car.
The guard also testified that the right front fender of the defendant's car
was damaged and a photograph received in evidence corroborated his testimony.
Another photograph indicated that there was nothing to obstruct the view of a
driver in either lane approaching the cut-off.
On these facts the lower court entered a compulsory non-suit on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the accident was the result of the defendant's negligence, having shown nothing but the mere happening of an
accident.
In reversing this order and granting a new trial the Supreme Court said,
"The physical facts appearing of record plus the plaintiff's testimony and the
defendant's admissions, as related by the guard, were sufficient to warrant a
finding by the jury that the defendant, upon turning from her line of parallel travel
in the inner lane into the cut-off, failed to see what must have been plainly
observable in the outer lane and, as a consequence, negligently drove her car into
the rear of the plaintiff's car then passing the cut-off in a direct and unchanged
line of travel in the outer lane."
In a strikingly parallel case, Pelosi v. Hoffman, 94 Pa. Super. 398 (1928),
the collision occurred in a cut-off on the same highway, Roosevelt Boulevard in
Philadelphia, the only factual difference from the Neff case being that the
plaintiff was in the inner lane and the defendant, moving in the same direction,
was crossing over from the outer to the inner lane when he struck the plaintiff's
car in the rear.
In the Pelosi case the defendant appealed from a refusal of his motion for
judgment non obstante veredicto. He denied negligence on the ground that he
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had a statutory right of way under the provision in Section 25 of the Act of June
30, 1919, P.L. 678, 75 PS 372. that where two vehicles approach an intersection
of two highways at the same time the vehicle approaching from the right shall
have the right of way.
In holding that the rule applies only where two vehicles are approaching
the intersection of two streets from different streets Judge Keeler said, "It has
no application to two vehicles traveling in one direction on the same street, and
approaching an intersecting street not used by either of them. It is to the vehicle
approachihg on the right from said intersecting street that section 25 of the Act
of 1919 gives the right of way. Where two cars are traveling in a parallel direction on the same street, the one on the right has no superior right of way
over the one on the left, at either a cross-over or intersecting street, which justifies
his cutting in ahead of the car on his left, or running into its rear."
Having found the defendant's contention without merit the Superior Court
in the Pelosi case held that the trial court properly left the question of the defendant's negligence to the jury and affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
While the mere happening of a collision, even a collision where the plaintiff's car is struck in the rear by the defendant's, is insufficient proof of the
defendant's negligence, Cirquitella v. C. C. Callaghan, Inc., 331 Pa. 465 (1938),

it would seem from the Neff case that such proof is sufficient to prevent a compulsory non-suit. When proof of a rear-end collision is corroborated by photographic exhibits of the damage to the two vehicles and the defendant has made
admissions as to the occurrence of such a collision a finding by the jury that the
defendant was negligent in failing to observe the plaintiff's car in front of him, or
having seen it, failing to avoid the collision that ensued, is warranted by the
evidence.
ROBERT L. RUBENDALL

CRIMINAL LAW: MURDER-REQUIRED INTENT-"RUSSIAN POKER"
A recent Pennsylvania case, Com. v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180 (1946), has
graphically emphasized the distinction between the element of intent in first and
in second degree murder.
The defendant in this case, a 17 year old boy, suggested to a 13 year old
friend that they play "Russian Poker." A footnote in Com. v. Malone, supra,
describes Russian Poker as "a game in which the participants in turn place a
single cartridge in one of the five chambers of a revolver cylinder, give the latter
a quick twirl, place the muzzle of the gun against the temple and pull the trigger
leaving it to chance whether or not death results to the trigger puller." The
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young friend assented to the "game." The defendant then took a 32 caliber
tevolver into which he had inserted a cartridge in one of the chambers to the
right of the firing pin, and leveling the gun at the victim's side, the defendant
pulled the trigger three times. The third trigger squeeze fired the gun.
The defendant claimed that he did not expect to have the gun go off and
that he had not intended to harm the decedent. A jury found him guilty of
murder in the second degree. He appealed from the conviction contending that
at most the facts could support only a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
The Supreme Court, however, sustained his conviction.
Murder is defined as "the unlawful homicide of a human being with malice
aforethought, either express or implied. Com. v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218
(1928). "Manslaughter is defined to be the unlawful killing of another without malice..." Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868). Thus, the success of the defense
in the instant case was predicated upon the issue as to whether or not, under the
facts as presented, there was malice displayed on the part of the defendant.
In the opinion by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Maxey emphasized the
distinctions and requirements of malice in the various degrees of murder in
Pennsylvania. Part of the charge by the trial judge had revealed common misconceptions as to the definitions of malice in murder of the first and murder of the
second degrees.
The intent to take human life is the essential and distinguishing element of
malice in murder of the first degree. Com. v. Divomte, 262 Pa. 504; Com. v.
McLaughlin, supra. This consideration of course does not include murder
resulting from the commission of a felony. The classic Pennsylvania definition cf
malice in murder of the second degree has been that of Chief Justice Agnew in
Com. v. Drum, supra; "Malice comprehends not only a particular ill will, but
every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a
particular person may not be intended to be injured." In Com. v. McLaughlin, it
is stated that "malice may be inferred from the wanton and reckless conduct of one
who kills another, from wicked disregard of the consequences of his act." The
trial judge, however, in Com. v. Malone, had charged that, "It is the duty of the
Commonwealth to prove that the killing was unlawful and intentional, and if the
evidence taken as a whole raises reasonable doubt in the minds of tht jury as to
whether the killing was accidental or intentional, you must acquit the accused."
As Chief Justice Maxey points out in his opinion, this. is in effect to charge that
unless the Commonwealth proves murder in the first degree, the defendant cannot be convicted of murder in any degree, for the specific intent to kill is an
element only of murder in the first degree.
The facts of the case present an act and a result. The act is the pulling of
the trigger of the gun three times while it was held against the boy's side. The
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result was the young lad's death. The defendant might have intended the act and
the result. If so, he would have been guilty of murder in the first degree. He
could, however, have intended the act and not the result. In that case, the jury
could have found (and in fact did so find) that the defendant acted with such
a "wicked disregard of the consequences of his act" that the element of malice
sufficient for murder in the second degree would be shown.
Intent in murder may thus be an-intent to kill or, under the conditions prescribed above, an intent to do an act which results unintentionally in the commission
of a homicide. As Chief Justice Maxly concludes in this case: "This killing was,
therefore, murder, for malice in the sense of a wicked disposition is evidenced by
the intentional doing of an uncalled for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful
,effects on others."
RAYMOND K. HESS

TORTS: NEGLIGENCE-BUSINESS VISITORS
Johnson v. Y. M. C. A., 354 Pa. 563, 47 A. 2d 653, (1946), was an action
brought under the wrongful death and survival statutes 'by the mother of the
deceased as administratrix of his estate and in her own right. A compulsory nonsuit was entered and an appeal'taken from the refusal to remove the nonsuit.
The deceased was a lodger for the night in the Chester Y. M. C. A. After
engaging a bed in the dormitory he went to the desk clerk and requested a hot
bath. The clerk directed him to the shower and gave him soap and a towel. Later,
the clerk while making a routine tour of the building as night watchman found
the deceased floating in the Y. M. C. A. swimming pool. He was removed and
a futile attempt to resuscitate him was made. The showers were located 'near the
swimming pool but it was necessary to go through two doors and up a short flight
of stairs to get to the'pool. The showers were at the end of the corridor along
which is located the first door to the pool. The pool and all adjacent rooms were
well lighted. The clerk had detected 'an odor of liquor on the deceased when he
engaged the room, but the deceased was not drunk and apparently normal. The
plaintiff's motion to take off the nonsuit was dismissed.
In dismissing the motion, the court reiterated the standard of care required
of a possessor of land to a'business visitor. That duty is only ordinary care.
He must exercise such watchfulness and care as will reasonably secure the safety
of the business visitor. He is not an insurer. Ritchey v. Cassone, 296 Pa. 249,
145 A. 822, (1929); Prosser on Torts (1941), p. 642.
The court also reaffirmed itsstandard test for negligence inPennsylvania.
"In Pennsylvania, liability for negligence depends upon the antecedent probability,
not the mere possibility, of harmful results therefrom. The general test of liability
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is whether the injury imputed to the defendant is such that a person of ordinary
intelligence would have foreseen it as the natural and probable outcome of his
conduct."

Rugart v. Keebler - Weyl Baking Co., 277 Pa. 408, 121 A. 198,

This has long been the yardstick for the measure of negligence in
(1923).
Pennsylvania, though masquerading under such terms as "proximate cause" or
"limitation of the liability of the risk."
293, (1877).

Hoag v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 85 Pa.

The interesting point raised by this case is that the liability of the possessor
to the business visitor exists only so long as the business visitor remains upon
that portion of the premises which the possessor gives the visitor reason to believe
that his presence is permitted or desired because of its connection with the business.
The court was content to rely upon Restatement of Torts, Sec. 343, particularly
comment b. Support for this doctrine may also be found in Prosser, p. 640, and
the following Pennsylvania cases: Kreig v. P.R.R., 4 Walker (Pa.) 268 (1867);
Johnson v. Wilcox, 135 Pa. 217, 19 A. 939, (1890), where the plaintiff, while
on his way to a dance hall in the 3rd story of a building having a safe entrance
by a well-lighted hall and stairway, stepped through a door on the third floor
onto a dark platform and fell to the ground; Greis v. Hazard, 209 Pa. 276,
(.1904), where the plaintiff went in a door into which goods were unloaded
from cars, the door being 3' 8" above the track level and posted with signs forbidding persons to enter, and fell through an open unguarded hole in the floor.
In Edmunson v. Monongahela P. & L., 223 Pa. 93 (1909), the plaintiff went

into a factory directly, without going to the office, to find plant superintendent and
was injured by striking an electrical device which shocked him. See LeGrand ;.
Traction Co., 10 Pa. Super. 12 (1899), where the plaintiff drowned while swimming in a pond at a picnic grounds, and note the dissent. In Foard v. Roth, 33
Pa. Super. 182 (1907), the plaintiff, after delivering merchandise, went from the
office to the factory for no apparent reason and was injured by a fall through
a hole in the wall. The above cases indicate where the Pennsylvania courts will
draw the line. It is apparent that a line must be drawn for each case, depending
on the facts.
The question is then raised: What is the status of one who has gone out of
the area of the business invitation? It is something less than that of a business
visitor and he becomes a trespasser or licensee depending upon the circumstances.
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 343. It should be noted that if the business visitor
is misled through the intention or negligence of the possessor to enter into an
area of the premises not included in the business invitation, the visitor retains
his status and the duties of the possessor remain the same. Clop v. Mear, 134 Pa.
203, (1890); Restatement of Torts, Sec. 343, comment c.

Although not necessary for the case the Court mentioned that a business visitor himself must be alert. He cannot walk into an obvious danger with impunity.
The duty of the business visitor is that of ordinary care required of all persons to
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look where they are going. "Walker v. Broad & Walnut Corp. 320 Pa. 504, 182 A.
643, (1936), and Prosser on Torts, p. 642. If the danger is obvious to a reasonable person or the possessor has warned the business visitor of the danger,
the possessor's liability may be relieved.
RICHARD W. HOPINS

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
LICENSE -

-

HEALTH CERTIFICATE

The institution of common-law marriage remained unassailed by the courts
of Pennsylvania until the case of Fisher v. Sweet & McClain, 154 Pa. Super. 216
(1943), and the doubt that that case threw upon the ability to validly contract
a common-law marriage in Pennsylvania has finally been dissolved by the case
of Buradus v. General Cement Products Co., 159 Pa. Super. 501 (1946).
In the Fisher case, though not actually raised or involved in the case, the
Superior Court took the occasion to reconsider, by way of dicta, the application of
acts of assembly providing for the issuance of marriage licenses, to common-lav
marriage.
The first of these statutes was the Act of June 23, 1885, PL 146, 48 PS 2,
which provided, inter alia, that "no person within this Commonwealth shall be
joined in marriage, until a license shall have been obtained for that purpose;"
and it, as well as its subsequent amending statutes, had been consistently construed
by the courts as relating solely to civil and religious ceremonial marriages, and
marriages solemnized in writing by the parties themselves-and not as requiring
a license for a common-law marriage.
The particular statute the Court had in mind in the Fisher case, however,
was the Act of May 17, 1939, PL 148.

On March 9, 1945, PL 41, this act was

reenacted without material change in language. Later in the same session another
Act incorporated the same provisions, almost verbatim, in an "Act for the prevention of venereal diseases." This Act of May 16, 1945. PL 577, 35 PS 587.6,
repealed the 1939 Act as well as the prior 1945 Act.
The Act of 1939, said the Court, was enacted not for the purpose of keeping
true and correct records of all marriages within the Commonwealth (as the other
statutes), but for a wholly different purpose, i.e., to preserve the public health,
and consequently, should be construed so as to effectuate that result if possible.
The Act required a serological test for syphilis before a marriage license
could be issued, and was entitled, "Regulating the issuance of marriage licenses;
prohibiting the issuance thereof to persons infected with syphilis in certain stages;
requiring each applicant to produce certain evidence of freedom from such di-
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sease; imposing duties upon the Department of Health and the clerk of the
orphans' court of the various counties, and imposing penalties." The title makes
no reference to common-law marriage, and one reading the text or title could not
reasonably apprehend that common-law marriage was being affected in any
manner. Nevertheless, the Court, in the interests of public health and the elimination of fraud and perjury so often occuring with respect to common-law mariages, said, "A valid common-law marriage cannot hereafter be entered into in
this Commonwealth without first complying with the Act of 1939, and securing
a marriage license pursuant to its provisions."
This declaration neither affected existing common-law marriages, nor required a formal ceremony of marriage in the future. It still left the door open
to a valid informal marriage without civil or religious ceremony, if the parties
first obtained a marriage license, and the license had to be secured before any
marriage thereafter entered into could be valid.
In Vujatovich's Estate, 51 D & C (1944), in sustaining exceptions to the
finding of the auditing judge that exceptant was not "the common-law husband
of decedent," the court, after finding that a valid common-law marriage by verba
de praesenti had been entered into on March 23, 1940 (before the judicial rule
of the Fisher case was announced), no marriage license having been obtained,
observed, "The recent decision in the Superior court case 154 Pa. Super. 216, is
cited in the brief on behalf of contestant. In this decision the Act of May 17, 1939,
PL 148, is discussed. This legislation has no bearing upon the present case because by its terms it does not take effect until one year after final enactment, May
17, 1940, whereas in the present case the marriage contract was entered into approximately two months before that date."
In Sahutsky v. E.G. Budd Mfg. Co., 55 D&C 466 (1945), claimant claimed
an award as common-law wife of deceased. The Workmen's Compensation Board
found sufficient evidence to establish the existence of the marriage and said, "We
are not prepared to say, nor is it necessary for the purpose of the present opinion,
to determine whether a health certificate was prerequisite to a valid common-law
marriage between the parties hereto on March 31, 1942. Since the cotnmon-law
marriage as well as the death of Sahutsky occurred prior to the date of the Superior court's opinion, we are constrained to hold that the marriage was valid and
that the Act of May 17, 1939, did not apply."

On appeal, the county court, after observing that the records in the case
would indicate that neither on examination nor cross-examination was the claimant asked by counsel whether or not she had first secured a license to enter into the
common-law marriage, so that that matter was not now before the court, decided
that since the Act of 1939 contained no express words of nullity it was directory
only and not mandatory, and hence did not apply to or affect the validity of a
common-law marriage, and consequently affirmed the finding of the Board.
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The judicial rule of the Fishercase threw considerable doubt upon the validity
of future common-law marriages in Pennsylvania, and as indicated by Vujatovich's
Estate and the Sahutsky case, there was a reluctance in the lower courts to follow
its reasoning and adopt it as law, even though by its terms it was not applicable to
the facts of either case. However, no appellate court had the opportunity to affirm
or deny it until the Buradus case.
This case, as did the Fisher case, grew out of a decision of the Workmen's

Compensation Board refusing an award, but while the board did not find the existence of a common-law marriage in the Fisher case, they did find the existence of
one in the Buradus case. In the latter case, however, the award was refused by the
Board on the basis of the dicta in the former case, no marriage license having been
obtained by the parties. On appeal from the decision of the Board, the county
court entered judgment for claimant, since the marriage contract was found by the
Board to have been entered into on November 16, 1941, before the date of the
Fisher opinion, and the dicta therein emphatically limited itself to common-law
marriages thereafter entered into.
On appeal by the defendant from the judgment of the county court, the
Superior Court said that regardless of,
(a) The view taken as to whether or not the construction of a statute can
be limited to conduct occurring thereafter or must become a part of the
statute from the very beginning, or,
(b) Claimant's justification in relying on the prospectiveness of the
Fisher dicta,

and despite the fact that an award might well be entered on the latter ground,
"frankness compels us to say that we, on re-examination of the question have
found our declaration in the Fisher case untenable."
The reasons given by the Court for abandoning their former declaration, were:
(a) The fact that it was pure dicta, and so did not presently become
effective to work a change in the law.
(b) The Act of 1939 did not refer to common-law marriage specifically,
so therefore could not be presumed to make any change in the commonlaw.
(c) The history of the Act of 1939 indicates that it was not intended
by the legislature to include common-law marriage within its purview.
Earlier in the session of 1939, an act identical in material respects was
vetoed by Governor James, on the ground that it made no reference to
common-law marriage and because of procedural defcts. The procedural defects were corrected in the redraft which became the Act of
May 17, 1939, but the reference to common-law marriage was neither
discussed by the House or Senate, nor mentioned in the redraft.
The Court then reiterates the necessity for something to identify and dislinguish the rarely actual common-law marriage from the spurious, but concludes,
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"Whether the suggestion of the Fisher case is to be given effect will be exclusively
for the legislature to determine."
So once again, through the cancellation of dikta by dicta, the institution of
common-law marriages emerges, perhaps shaken but still standing, as law in
Pennsylvania.
TOM H. BIETSCH

DECEDENTS' ESTATES: SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ORPHANS' COURT

APPROVAL BY

A principle of law, founded upon both decisional and statutory law, that has
been enforced for nearly one hundred years in Pennsylvania, was changed by the
two recent cases of In re Brereton's Estate, 28 A. 2d 868 (1946), and In re Van
Voohris' Estate, 49 A. 2d 257 (1946).
When an executor, as in Brittain's Estate, 28 Pa. Super. 144 (1905), having

a testamentary power to sell decedent's real estate or when an executor or administrator, after petitioning the orphans' court to sell real estate to pay debts of the
estate, contracts to sell the real estate, the courts have exercised their powers to
"upset" any such agreement before a deed has been executed and delivered if a
higher offer be made. This was based upon the broad policy that the courts should
protect the interests of the individual estate.
The leading case where this theory was expounded is Demmy's Appeal, 43
Pa. 155 (1862).
In that case the Supreme Court said: "But the reasons which
apply to private executory contracts of sale and which have led to the establishment
of the principle that a vendee by articles is, in equity, the owner of the land which
was the subject of the contract . . . do not apply with equal force to orphans'
court sales for the payment of the debts of a decedent. Such sales arc not absolute and unconditional. They depend for their validity upon the approval and
confirmation of the court. They are liable to be vacated by a power superior to
the purchaser and against his will. The sale, even after confirmation, does not
divest the title of the heirs of the decedent, for it remains in the power of the
court until a deed has been executed and delivered." And further in this decision
there appears this expression: "In substantial fact, the purchaser buys from the
court through its agent. The court reserves the power to decline his bid and to
disannul the act of its agent, until the sale has been fully consummated."
The courts followed the above principle diligently in both types of cases as
represented by the following cases: Hamilton's Estate, 51 Pa. 58 (1865); Dundas'r
Appeal, 64 Pa. 325 (1870); Brown's Appeal, 68 Pa. 53 (1871); Orr's Estate,
283 Pa. 476 (1925); Power's Estate, 153 Pa. Super. 163 (1943). However, the
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principle was much criticized on tht grounds that it defeated the very purpose
which it was invoked to protect. Because of the uncertainty created by the ruling
and the possibility of a higher "upset" bid being interjected before thL sale could
be consummated, such real estate did not find as ready a market as real estate not
so involved. Hence the very interests deemed to be protected actually suffered.
This was particularly true in some counties of the Commonwealth where mere
nominally higher bids were accepted.
In Kane et al. v. Girard Trust Co., 351 Pa. 191 (1945), although the action
was laid in the common pleas court, the rule again came under review. From
the dissenting and concurring opinion filed by Chief Justice Maxey, and Justices
Stearne and Stem, the following is extracted: "If the question were still open and
had not become a settled Pennsylvania rule of property, which only the Legislature should now change, we would strongly question the principle of Orr's Estate,
283 Pa. 476, 129 A. 656 and the cases which followed it. In the absence of
fraud, accident or mistake, and when the price is adequate, we can discover no
reason why an honest sale made by a fiduciary should be set aside merely because
of a subsequent higher offer. .

.

.

We also suggest that the attention of the

Legislature might well be called to the question of the advisability of changing
by statute the effect of the decision in Orr's Estate and the cases which have fol.
lowed it."
Stemming, no doubt, from the above quoted suggestion by the Court and the
difficulties surrounding sales of real -estate by fiduciaries, mentioned previously in
this discussion, the Legislature of Pennsylvania enacted the Act of May 24, 1945,
P. L. 944, 20 PS 818, 819. The pertinent sections of this act are as follows:
"Section 1. When a fiduciary shall hereafter make a contract not requiring approval of court or when the court shall hereafter approve a contract of a fiduciary
requiring approval of court, neither inadequacy of consideration, nor the receipt
of an offer to deal on other terms, shall except as otherwise agreed by the parties,
relieve the fiduciary of the obligation to perform his contract or shall constitute
ground for any court to set aside the contract, or to refuse to enforce it by specific
performance or otherwise: Provided, That this act shall not affect or change the
inherent right of a court to set aside a contract for fraud, accident or mistake.
Section 2. Nothing in this act shall offset the liability of a fiduciary for surcharge
on the ground of negligence or bad faith in making a contract."
Two cases came before the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County and both
were subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In the
first case, In re Brereton's Estate, supra, an ancillary executor filed a petition,
under Section 16 of the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, 20 PS 321 et seq.,
with the Orphans' Court to sell real estate for the payment of debts. The Court
fixed a day for hearing and on that day, after competitive bidding, a private sale
was ordered at a higher price than had been bid previously. In the second case, In re Van Voorhris' Estate, supra, the trustees under a will had
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testamentary power to sell the real estate "at public or private sale, to such person
or persons for such prices, and upon such terms as the trustees might consider
proper." The Orphans' Court enjoined the trustees from performing their agreement of sale to a lower but prior bidder. Hence, it can be seen that each of these
cases covered one of the two general classifications of cases, embraced by the above
mentioned act. The Orphans' Court in its opinion held that the act was unconstitutional on the ground that it limited or restricted the supervisory power that
had been exercised and therefore "vested" in the orphans' courts prior to the
effective date of the present Constitution of 1874, and that such legislation was
prohibited by Article V, Section 22 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court in a 5-2 decision, holding that
the orphans' courts were courts of limited powers conferred by statutes and that
the Legislature could amend, add to, or reduce such powers; hence the Act of
May 24, 1945, P. L. 944, 20 PS 818, 819, was constitutional.

Without making an attempt to prognosticate any future trends, will we see
the orphans' courts in the exercise of their judicial and proper function of protecting the assets of estates develop the followingr
First: Insisting that in petitions submitted by fiduciaries, requesting
permission to sell real estate, complete and detailed information be set
forth as to the steps taken by the fiduciary to determine that the best
possible bid has been received; and
Second: Allowing a surcharge against the fiduciaries in those cases
wh'ere court permission is not necessary and objections to the final accounts of fiduciaries are raised, if their conduct has not been of a more
exacting standard than "satisfactory proof of supine negligence or wilful
default?"
The above standard is taken from these cases: Moore's Appeal, 10 Pa. 435
(1849); Leslie Appeal, 63 Pa. 355 (1869); and Drueding v. Tradesmans National Bank, 319 Pa. 144 (1935).
RAYMOND E. EVLETH

